We study the welfare implications of competing middlemen in a two-sided market, where goods are intermediated between providers and purchasers. In our model, the intermediary sets the quantities to purchase and sell, and the prices are a consequence of a Cournot model. Our analysis shows that, unlike markets without intermediaries, mergers of intermediaries can substantially improve social and consumer welfare. We also analyze how the underlying network influences the social welfare outcomes. We define parameter w G as the intermediary capacity of the network G and show that the price of anarchy is at least 1 − 1 2w G +1 . These results suggest an intuitive and simple measure for the level of competitiveness in a networked market involving intermediaries.
Introduction
Because of digital technologies, platform markets -where an intemediary enables connections between providers and purchasers of services -are becoming popular. In addition to the new age companies (such as Uber, Google and Facebook), many leading 'traditional' ones inlcuding Cummins, Kaiser Permanente, GE, etc. are developing their digital platform strategies. They perceive the push toward platform business model as even being critical to their survival (Accenture, 2016) .
So, there is an extensive and growing literature focused on developing platform strategies from a single firm's perspective. However, there are very few prior works studying the implications of platforms in a competitive environment. Understanding the eco-systems of competing and heterogeneous platforms is important because it provides insights for not only individual companies but also the policy makers. Our interest in this problem was piqued because of the following anecdote. the merged firm AB becomes a monopoly when serving 1 and 4; however, the merged entity now competes with C to deliver ads between advertiser 3 and publisher 2. Thus, unlike the traditional seller-buyer models, the merging of intermediaries can even increase competition. As a result, the overall efficiency of such an economy depends critically on the underlying network structure. This means that, in large and complex networks, understanding the implications of antitrust policies becomes difficult. In this paper, we present this idea more formally. In addition, we ask the following question. Can we use a simple but intuitive set of network parameters to estimate the level of efficiency? The answers to this question not only give insights into the nature of competition among the intermediaries in a networked market but also provide guidelines for conducting policy analysis when comparing alternate network structures. As the platform markets continue to grow, one can anticipate more number of partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions. Hence, it is becoming increasingly important to understand the welfare implications of these markets.
We are already seeing some similar dynamics in platform markets. Consider the transformations in digital ads market. There are new entrants in this market such as the mobile ad service by Amazon (began in 2013) . Mergers are also quite commonplace in this sector: Microsoft bought aQuantitative in 2012; and Yahoo purchased Interclick in 2011. Another example of the platform market are the ride-sharing companies, which is also undergoing a significant transformation. In that sector, Lyft and Didi Chuxing were initially in a partnership to thwart Uber. Eventually, Uber merged its operation with Didi Chuxing. Yet another example is in the e-commerce space, where online market-makers are intermediaries connecting sellers and buyers. Amazon and Walmart competed fiercely to buy the Indian online retailer Flipkart, which Walmart eventually won.
The issues we study in our paper are not just specific to the new age markets, but also are relevant for other markets with similar structures. The network services segment is transforming with "intermediaries" such as AT&T acquiring other intermediaries such as DirectTV. Similarly, in the traditional world, retailers may be viewed as simply intermediating between manufacturers and consumers. Our analysis can provide insights into mergers and acquisitions in such cases also.
We investigate the welfare implications of a marketplace involving multiple intermediaries.
An intermediary may serve multiple providers (e.g., web publishers with ad-slots, or ride-sharing drivers) and purchasers (e.g., advertisers, ride-sharing passengers respectively). A provider or a purchaser may connect with multiple intermediaries. The dependencies create a networked market structure. We study how the nature of networked structure have welfare implications. In general, the price clearing mechanisms vary -for example, GSP is used in the ad auctions or dynamic 'surge prices' for ride-shares, etc. We employ a Cournot competition as the price clearing mechanism.
Such a model leads us to identify a unique equilibrium, which is specified by a quadratic program.
With this characterization, we provide several comparative analyses. We show that competition in an unbalanced market can reduce social welfare. Mergers in sparse markets, however, can create competition and improve market efficiency. We also study how well the best social welfare obtained using the networked structure in equilibrium compares with the maximum social welfare by using the price of anarchy measure. Obviously, the price of anarchy is dependent on the intensity of competition, which we capture through the term intermediary capacity of the network. Specifically, we find that the larger the intermediary capacity of the network, the more efficient the equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we survey the related literature. Section 3 formally defines the model, which is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 provides some comparative analysis. Section 6 studies the impact of the network structure on the level of efficiency. Section 8 concludes the paper. Some technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Literature Review
Our work relates to several streams of research. The first stream is the well-established literature on platform-based markets. The second stream is the literature on networked markets that is nascent but growing extensively. We provide a brief survey of the first stream and somewhat more extended one of the second. Since there is some related work in individual contexts (ad markets, ride-sharing, etc.) we also provide a brief survey of the related work as the third subsection.
Platform Economics
Our paper studies intermediaries that connect different sides of a market, as found in the literature on network-effect based platforms. This domain has been extensively researched. The early focus on this literature was on single-sided networks (e.g., the seminal work by Katz and Shapiro, 1985) but has expanded in recent years to include multi-sided platforms (e.g., Parker and Van-Alstyne, 2005 , study two-sided networks). Many papers have analyzed the strategic aspects to managing these network based platforms. For example, they analyze what the pricing strategies should be, how to launch a network effects based market.
A recent few papers have also studied the welfare implications. Lee (2014) has studied the problems involving single-sided networks. Others (Evans and Schmalensee, 2013; Weyl, 2010) have studied it with respect to the two-sided markets. To the best of our knowledge, these papers have not considered the welfare implications of mergers across the intermediaries. Moreover, the "network" effects studied in these paper are very different from ours. In particular, most papers in platform economic literature model symmetric environments and focus on the externality/complementarity effect that a platform creates for its members. This is, for example, integrated directly into a member's utility that depends on how many others are using the same platform. Our paper, on the other hand, moves away from such effects to focus on the impact of heterogeneity in the connection structure. This other type of "network effect" is actively investigated by a relatively new but fast-growing literature on network markets that we survey next.
Network Markets
The majority of the early literature on network markets focuses on seller-buyer networks. Kranton and Minehart (2001) , Corominas-Bosch (2004) , (Abreu and Manea, 2012; Manea, 2011; Polanski, 2007) and Elliott (2014) are a few examples. By assumption, all these papers rule out intermediaries and focus only on the trade between buyers and sellers. Blume et al. (2009) was among the first to investigate a mediated market in a network setting.
The network structure in our paper is similar to that of Blume et al. (2009 ). However, Blume et al. (2009 consider Bertrand competition among intermediaries and assume buyers have unit demand. In two-sided markets, such as ad-networks, considering multi-unit demand and supply with heterogeneity among the players is more relevant. In the context of ad-intermediaries, agents target different amounts of impressions, and trades are executed by market-clearing auctions. It is natural, therefore, to study such a network using a Cournot model, which we do in this paper.
Such a characterization is a unique feature of our model. Because of the differences in the model characterizations, the equilibrium outcomes are also different. All equilibria in Blume et al. (2009) are efficient, whereas, that is not the case in our model. Hence, our main aim of measuring the level of efficiency based on the structure of the underlying network is relevant.
Our paper is closely related to recent models of Cournot competition in networks by Bimpikis et al. (2018) and Perakis and Sun (2014) . However, unlike us, they do not consider intermediaries.
We compare our results with these papers in more detail in the subsequent sections. Bose et al. (2014) also studies intermediaries and market makers in a Cournot game. The main question that Bose et al. (2014) address is how to modify the objective of market makers to maximize social welfare. Here, we focus on how the network structure influences efficiency.
Several recent papers have studied intermediaries, including Nguyen (2015 , 2017 ) and Manea (2018 . The settings in these papers, however are quite different from ours. In particular, they study the incentive of non-cooperative bargaining and assume unit-demand agents. Even though, in the advertising industry, bargaining is part of the contracts, automated auctions control the majority of the interaction among the agents in those studies. Feldman et al. (2010) study the equilibrium properties in a model where buyers buy ad slots from a central buyer via a set of competing intermediaries. They demonstrate how the interaction between the auction design and double marginalization affects outcomes. Our paper is different from this work in that intermediaries in our model connect between multiple buyers and the sellers, and the prices are determined by the decentralized Cournot (sub)markets.
Context Specific Literature
Digital and search ads receive significant attention from various domains, including computer science, marketing, information systems, and economics. A seminal piece in this regard is from Edelman et al. (2007) in which they analyze the equilibrium of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Variants of GSP have been implemented and also studied. More generally, papers have also evaluated the welfare implications of the search ads market. Usually, they are executed in the context of a single ad-intermediary. For example, Chen and He (2011) evaluated the efficiency of ads on the consumer search process. Similarly, welfare implications are also studied when considering policy changes for the auctions. As another example, Shin (2015) study the subject of search engines requiring budget constraints for advertisers in GSP auctions.
More generally, computer science has extensively studied mechanism design problems in the ad network context. In the computer science literature, a number of papers have analyzed the mechanism design problem from the perspective of matching algorithms -specifically, how to match ads to positions (e.g., Mehta et al., 2007; Caragiannis et al., 2015) . Note that we focus on multiple search ad intermediaries.
The literature on ride sharing is expanding rapidly in recent years. See for example Cachon et al. however has been on the optimal design of a monopoly's matching and pricing mechanisms. Our paper, on the other hand, considers the problem from an industry level perspective. Given that there are many competing platforms and the connections of these platforms with the two sides of the markets are heterogeneous, our paper analyzes the impact of such underlying network structure to the efficiency of the whole ecosystem. In the intermediary contexts, the demand and supply significantly change over time and so, the price changes are highly unpredictable and volatile. Modeling these price variations in general is quite hard. However, given our interest in studying the role of network structure on outcomes, it is sufficient to study this using a parsimonious static model. where the set of edges connect the J providers with the I intermediaries and also the I intermediaries with the K purchasers. In the ad-auction context, webpage publishers would correspond to the providers, advertisers to the purchasers, and intermediaries to companies similar to Google or
Yahoo. The goods traded in this marketplace are the ad-slots on webpages. In the ride-sharing context, the good traded is the taxi service; and drivers and passengers in a specific geographic area are the providers and purchasers, respectively. The ride-sharing companies such as Uber, Didi
Chuxing, and Lyft, choosing to operate in the different regions, are the intermediaries. When we refer to an individual intermediary, provider, and purhcaser, we denote them by the corresponding lower-case variables i, j, and k respectively.
Next, consider the bargaining power in this eco-system. One way to view the bargaining power is to compare the number of providers or purchasers versus the intermediaries in the market.
Given the fewer number of intermediaries (e.g., Google, Uber, Lyft), it should be clear that the intermediaries hold the power. Another way we argue for the intermediary's influence in the market is by considering the recent initiative by Facebook -subsequent to the follow out with Cambridge Analytica -to require all apps to re-specify the privacy policies. Another supporting fact is that intermediaries choose their own market-clearing (or price-determining) mechanisms: be it GSP for ad auctions or surge prices for ride-sharing context. Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, we model the purchasers and providers to not have any significant bargaining power relative to the intermediary and are assumed to simply respond to the offers. In line with that, we next define the decision variables and the payoff functions for each player.
Let intermediary i obtain x i j amount of goods (for example, number of slots) from provider j.
Define y i jk as the amount of goods/service provided by j to k via the intermediary i. Thus, in our model, an intermediary i offers a "package" of goods from different providers to a purchaser k.
One may view the packages differently depending on the context. For example, in ad auctions, a package corresponds to the number of ad slots that the intermediary allocates to a given advertiser at different publisher sites. Similarly, in the ride-sharing contexts, a specific passenger may obtain taxi services from different types of providers based on geographical regions. Note that this aspect where different purchasers may get different "packages" of bundles is a key difference from other models such as Bimpikis et al. (2018) , where they assume that the goods delivered are homogeneous.
Note also that, because the amount of goods that i delivers to provider j cannot be higher than the amount purchased from j, the following inventory constraint must be satisfied:
Define X j = i x i j as the total amount of goods requested from all the intermediaries for provider j; and Y jk = i y i jk to be the total amount of goods provided by j to k. The amount of goods that are finally allocated to a provider j is T j = i∈I k∈K y i jk . Notice that X j ≥ T j .
Given these variables, the provider's payoff is:
where P j is the unit price at j determined by a market clearing mechanism that we describe later. We assume that j faces an increasing convex cost C j (T j ) with respect to the amount of goods allocated, T j . For simplicity, we assume C j (T j ) = θ j T j + α j 2 T 2 j , where α j and θ j are nonnegative coefficients that are exogenous to our model (it also normalized such that the cost is zero when T j = 0). In the advertising market, such a convex cost assumption is consistent with the dissatisfaction that ads impose on webpage viewers. In the ride-sharing context, the cost is reflective of the inconvenience that the drivers face from driving for long hours. We also assume that the provider charges a fixed unit penalty, f j ≥ 0, for the goods requested by the intermediary but not allocated to a purchaser. This penalty is imposed on the unused but reserved capacity.
Next, we define the purchaser's utility. We assume that the utility of the purchaser k from the goods sold by provider j is U jk (Y jk ), where U jk is assumed to be concave for all j, k. (Recall that Y jk = i y i jk is the total amount of goods from provider j offered to k by all the intermediaries.)
Specifically, we assume that
where β jk and µ jk are non-negative coefficients that are also exogenous to our model (it also normalized such that the utility is zero when Y j = 0). To generate the initial set of insights, we assume that the payoff for purchaser k is separable as follows:
We later extend the model in Section 7 to capture the substitutability of goods. The purchaser's surplus is then given by:
where the unit price R jk that purchaser k needs to pay for goods from j is obtained from a market clearing mechanism described later.
Lastly, consider the intermediaries. Each intermediary i maximizes its payoff, which is the difference between the money paid by the purchasers and the amount paid to the providers:
Next we define how prices are discovered through a market clearing mechanism that varies with the context. As mentioned earlier, the examples include GSP in ad-auctions and the "surge-pricing" in ride-sharing contexts. If one ignored for a moment the context-specific pricing mechanism, the structure is reminiscient of quantities first, then prices models. The quantity-first then prices is best exemplified in the surge prices, which are set by Uber (or Lyft) after considering the supply of the drivers at a given location. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) shows that "the SPE outcome of the twostage model 'first quantities, then prices' also corresponds to the Cournot equilibrium." This led to us considering Cournot competition in our context as the price clearning mechanism. It turns out that prior work has extensively shown similarities between Cournot competition models and nonCournot settings. Daughtery (2008) provides a survey of such works. A work cited in their survey is Klemperer (1986) who shows the conditions when their modeling of a competition resembles Cournot outcomes. Specifically with respect to auctions and cournot models, the following works have made the connections. In the FCC spectrum auction, Milgrom (2004) argues that in a model with positive supply elasticity, the "auction outcomes resemble a Cournot competition among buyers." Vasin and Kartunova (2016) studies the electricity markets using a similar structure.
More specifically, in the ad-auctions, it has been used by Itai Ashlagi (2018); Nava (2015) and Bimpikis et al. (2018) . We believe that these pointers justify the use of Cournot competitions.
As regards the quantity decisions, consistent with our discussion on bargaining power, we assume that the variables x i j and y i jk will be chosen endogenously in our model by the intermediary in the first stage. The variable x i j is set to zero if intermediary i is not connected to j, and y i jk is zero if either provider j or purchaser k is not connected to i. However, it is possible at equilibrium that x i j = 0 and y i jk = 0 even if both (ij) and (ik) are connected by an edge in the network G.
Consistent with the discussion on the previous paragraph, given x i j and y i jk , the prices and the revenues for all the participants are generated by Cournot competition in the second stage.
We first characterize the prices and revenues corresponding to the second stage. As a consequence of the Cournot competition, the price P j for the unit good offered by j is simply its marginal cost obtained from considering its payoff in Equation 2:
Similarly, for the purchaser, the marginal gain equaling the marginal payment determines R jk :
obtained from considering the purchaser's surplus in Equation 3. The game described above is denoted as Γ(N , θ, µ, α, β). Formally, in this game, we have the following definition of an equilibrium:
is an equilibrium if they satisfy (1) and no intermediary i can change x i , y i to improve his/her pay-off given by (4).
We illustrate the equilibrium with an example for two main reasons. The first is to show how the variables we defined earlier correspond to supply and demand functions. The second purpose is to provide a figurative perspective on social welfare, which we define subsequently.
Example 1. Consider the example with one provider, one purchaser, and one intermediary. The intermediary's decision variable is the amount, x, to buy from the provider and the amount, y, to deliver for the purchaser. We assume that the marginal cost for the provider is 1 + x and marginal gain for the purchaser in the market is 2 − y. Then, the intermediary pays the provider P = 1 + x, and charges the purchaser R = 2 − y. So, the intermediary maximizes
It is straightforward to see that the optimal solution is x = y = 1/4. Figure From an efficiency standpoint, we can see that when supply meets demand, that is, y = x and 2 − y = 1 + x, we have the maximum welfare obtained when x = y = 1/2. This maximum welfare corresponds to the area of the triangle ABC in the same figure. That corresponds to when the intermediary makes zero profit. In this scenario involving only one provider and one purchaser, increasing the number of intermediaries will always improve social welfare. However, that may not be the case when the market structure and networks are different, as will be shown later.
In order to be able to evaluate the social welfare generated for any given networked structure, we define social welfare as follows:
Definition 3.2. Given a strategy profile ( x, y), social welfare is
Equilibrium Characterization
In general, equilibria are hard to characterize in games with complex network structure but equilibrium always exists in our model. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique and can be characterized by a convex program. Hence, we are able to study the sensitivity of the network structure on various metrics. This section characterizes the nature of the equilibrium.
First, observe that all inventory constraints bind in equilibrium. This means that there cannot be any intermediary i that buys more from j, which is x i j , than k y i jk , because otherwise i improves the payoff by reducing x i j to k y i jk . Formally:
Lemma 4.1. Given an equilibrium x, y, then x i j = k y i jk .
Because of Lemma 4.1, the payoff of intermediary i expressed in (4) can be written as
Observe that, for every i ∈ I, the utility function above can be seen as a concave function of y.
Furthermore, notice also a constant Z exists such that if y i jk > Z then the payoff above is negative.
Therefore, the game we consider is a bounded, concave game. Because of Rosen (1965) , such a game has a pure equilibrium.
Given the specific payoff structure in our game, we can provide additional insights. For example, the equilibrium is unique and can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 4.2. If α j > 0, and β jk > 0, y is an equilibrium if and only if it is the unique solution of the following convex program with the unknowns y, x, X, and Y :
The formal proof is given in Appendix A. With network games, for general class of utilities, it is quite hard to prove the existence of equilibrium, let alone proving uniqueness. Even for this class of game and a simpler network, for example Bimpikis et al. (2018) , it was not known in the literature that equilibrium can be characterized as a convex program. This limitation exists even after they make certain unreasonable assumptions -for example, Bimpikis et al. (2018) needs additional assumptions that positive trades occurs on all links -to characterize equilibrium. In that regard, the simplicity of the equilibrium characterization of our model using a quadratic program is a novelty in itself. Because prior literature does not have the convex program characterization for the equilibrium, existence of the equilibrium is done using fixed point theorems, which do not have efficient computations. More importantly, though, because our convex program shows the equilibrium to be unique, it allows us to conduct robust comparative analysis.
Merging Intermediaries
Having established the equilibrium, we identify interesting insights about the effect of network structures on market efficiency. We claim that the welfare implications between the standard
Cournot model and our model using decentralized Cournot competition with intermediaries are quite different. In the classical Cournot competition, merging of firms always reduces competition and thereby reduces social welfare. Arguably, this theory is at the heart of the antitrust policies in the US. However, the traditional results from Cournot competition does not hold when the com-peting firms are intermediaries. This section considers the welfare implications when intermediaries merge. In Section 5.1, we begin by showing that merging the intermediaries can have a negative effect on social welfare, a result consistent with our intuition. The same section subsequently shows a seemingly counterintuitive result that increasing competition among intermediaries can decrease efficiency. In Section 5.2, we provide insights into how the competition on either side of the market can dictate the social welfare outcomes.
The Impact of Increasing Competition on Welfare
To demonstrate the effect of competition among intermediaries on market efficiency, consider the network shown in Figure 4 . In this example, intermediary #1 solely serves purchaser b but purchaser a is served by all J +1 intermediaries, including #1. Such a scenario can happen when intermediary #1 is a large incumbent intermediary that has an exclusive connection to a specific market b while the other intermediaries are new, small firms competing on a smaller market segment, a. Analyzing such a network structure is useful for gaining insights. It is also convenient because the merger of any two intermediaries not involving #1 will again result in a network structure that can be studied with our generic formulation. We simplify certain definitions and make additional assumptions for ease of exposition. Because there is only one provider, we simply denote α = α s , µ sa = µ a , and µ sb = µ b . The additional assumptions we make are as follows: θ s = 0 for the providers; and β = β sa = β sb for the purchasers.
Because intermediaries 2, 3, . . . , J + 1 are symmetric, y #j sa = y #2 sa and x #j sa = x #2 sa for any 1 < j ≤ J + 1. The equilibrium is therefore the optimal solution to the following program:
Notice that α and β capture the market sensitivity of the provider (seller) and the purchasers (buyers), respectively. We next consider two extreme cases in order to gain intuition about this network structure. The first one has α = 0, β = 1, and the second has α = 1, β = 0.
Case 1: α = 0, β = 1
Since α = 0, the unit price charged by the provider is a constant and is independent of the amount of goods sold. On the other hand, the value of goods allocated to purchasers is a diminishing marginal function. Thus, the most efficient way to allocate goods is when these marginals are 0, that is, allocate µ a and µ b amount of goods to purchaser a and b, respectively. The convex program above defines the equilibrium for this game as:
From this, we can calculate the amount of goods allocated to purchaser a to be J+1 J+2 µ a ; and to purchaser b to be µ b 2 . Therefore, we obtain the following result: social welfare. However, intermediary #1 remains as the monopoly for purchaser b.
Case 2: α = 1, β = 0 At first glance, increasing J may seem to make the market more efficient. However, as we show next, this is not always the case. Note that without Intermediaries #2, 3,. . . ,J+1, Intermediary #1
can internalize between the amount of goods allocated to purchasers a and b leading to a reasonably efficient outcome; but with Intermediaries #2,3,. . . ,J+1 present, the competition for purchaser a has an indirect effect on the prices for b as well, resulting in a more inefficient outcome. Suppose µ a < µ b . The equilibrium, which is the solution of the convex program above is:
Let us first consider the former case when µ a < µ b < 2µ a . The amount of goods delivered to a and b are Y sa = y
respectively, implying that, as J increases, the market for purchaser a becomes more competitive and Y sa naturally increases. As a consequence, Intermediary #1 now has to pay s more. Now, consider the total amount of goods delivered
Observe that the total amount of goods allocated to both a and b increase. From the efficiency point of view, there is clearly a tradeoff. If µ b is significantly larger than µ a but less than 2µ a , then delivering goods to b is preferred from the social standpoint. When J increases, it simply increases the competition for purchaser a which further pushes down the amount of goods for purchaser b, resulting in a more inefficient outcome. Next, we formally establish this result:
4 µ a ≤ µ b < 2µ a , as J increases, the welfare will decrease.
• 2µ a ≤ µ b the welfare is independent of J. Furthermore, the result is not specific to the network structure that we used for the analysis. In fact, a similar welfare analysis can be conducted on any ad-hoc network, as we show next.
Consider the impact of competing intermediaries on the share of surplus. Notice that, when µ b > 2µ a , intermediaries #2, . . . , J + 1 do not participate, and the equilibrium is independent of J.
So, we focus on the more interesting case µ a ≤ µ b ≤ 2µ a , in which we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5.3. α = 1, β = 0 and µ a ≤ µ b ≤ 2µ a ,
• as J increases, provider s's and purchaser a' payoff increase; but b's utility decreases.
• The payoff of all the intermediaries decreases as J increases.
See Appendix C for the proof.
Merger in an Ad hoc Network: An Illustrative Example
This section demonstrates how the sensitivity of the competition on either side must be considered in order to analyze the social welfare implications. For this, we consider the same network and the two scenarios shown in Figure 1 . In scenario I, three intermediaries A, B and C compete to deliver goods between purchasers 3 and 4 and providers 1 and 2. In scenario II, A and B merge. Notice that in scenario I, A and B compete to deliver goods from 1 to 4, but C is the only intermediary between 2 and 3. However, when A and B merge, the merged firm AB becomes the monopoly between 1 and 4, but becomes a competitor for C between 2 and 3.
Depending on how purchaser 3 values the goods from provider 2 relative to the valuations for the other purchaser-provider pairs, the merging of A and B may or may not improve social welfare.
Interestingly, for a wide range of parameter values, merging A and B improves consumer welfare.
A more specific analysis is given in the following result.
Corollary 5.4. Consider the network in Figure 1 and the following set of parameters α j = 1, furthermore, µ 23 = V ; β 23 = 1, µ 13 = µ 24 = 0; β 13 = β 24 = 0; µ 14 = 1; β 14 = 1; θ j = 0. If V > 1, then the revenue of AB after merger is larger than the combined revenue of A and B before merger; furthermore, both the social welfare and the consumer surplus in scenario II are also larger than in scenario I.
If 3/7 < V < 1, then the revenue of AB after merger is less than the combined revenue of A and B before merger; furthermore, the social welfare in scenario II is also less than that in scenario I, but not the consumer surplus.
The proof is based on the convex program characterization given in Theorem 4.2, which gives us an easy way to compute these equilibria. We omit the details of this calculation and provide only the intuition for the results. Notice that, in Scenario I, the path 2-3 is intermediated by consumer surplus differently. In our model, the providers and purchasers connected to the merged firms are directly impacted because of the merger. These direct impacts occur in addition to the indirect ones. Therefore, unlike theirs, we can study the implications of mergers of intermediaries.
In conclusion, this section demonstrates that social welfare implications critically depend on the network structure. Comparing two arbitrary networks is in general a difficult task, and mergers can have both positive and negative welfare implications. While we have studied interesting policy questions thus far, we are also interested in studying how close we can get to the social optima.
Specifically, we are interested in bounding the efficiency loss. Additionally, we are interested in analyzing how the parameters of our model may affect the efficiency-loss bounds.
Bounding Inefficiency
Our goal in this section is to build further on the previous section to show how network structure influences efficiency. Such insights can act as a guide for market designers or policy makers to evaluate alternative network structures from an efficiency standpoint. We specifically study how the network structures lead the social welfare obtained in the decentralized context compared with the optimal one (without any such constraint). For this purpose, we use the measure called price of anarchy which is the ratio between the welfare of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal social welfare without incentive constraints. This measure is studied in Dubey (1986) and is extensively used in computer science starting with Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) . If this ratio is close to 1, then it means that the system is almost optimal.
Price of Anarchy: Lower Bound
Definition 6.1. Let E ⊂ J × K be the set of node pairs j ∈ J; k ∈ K. Define OP T (E) as the optimal social welfare obtainable through the links in E, that is,
s.t : X, Y ≥ 0
If the set of connections (or links) in E constrain the trades to occur only between the connected (or linked) agents, OP T (E) is the maximum level of welfare the system can achieve. In our environment, a trade between j ∈ J and k ∈ K is possible only if they are connected to at least a common intermediary. Let E 1 ⊂ J × K be the set of such pairs. Namely, E 1 := {(j, k) ∈ J × K| there exists i ∈ I where both ji and ik are connected}.
Thus, at the equilibrium, the welfare is at most OP T (E 1 ). Our first result in this section provides a lower bound on the welfare of the equilibrium compared with OP T (E 1 ).
Theorem 6.2. The social welfare at the Nash equilibrium is at least 2/3 times the optimal social welfare, OP T (E 1 ).
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix D. There, we establish the equilibrium to be a series of inequalities. Using those inequalities, we determine the lower bound on the efficiency of the system. This lower bound of 
Price of Anarchy: Refined Lower Bound
Even though PoA is an interesting measure, it does not provide information about the role of the underlying network structure on welfare. For example, in Figure 1 , it may be interesting to obtain a more detailed efficiency comparison of the two networks. To obtain more general bounds that reveal the structure of networks, the following notions of network connectivity are important.
Definition 6.3. Given a network G whose nodes are partitioned into three disjoint classes J, I, K.
The edges of G connect nodes between JI and between IK. We define the κ-th layer of G, denoted as E κ (G) or E κ for short, to be the set of node pairs jk : j ∈ J; k ∈ K that are connected by at least κ nodes i ∈ I (that is both ji and ik are edges in G).
For example, for each of the networks in Figure 1 , the first layer of G, κ = 1, contains the pairs {13, 14, 23, 24}. The 2nd layer of network, κ = 2, in scenario I (on the left hand side) is the pair 14, and in Scenario II is the pair 23. Given this definition, our next result refines the price of anarchy for these layers of the network.
Theorem 6.4. Given a network G over the set of providers, purchasers and intermediaries the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium is at least
The proof of Theorem 6.4 is given in Appendix E. Relative to Theorem 6.2, Theorem 6.4
investigates the level of efficiency in a more refined way. In particular, Theorem 6.4 suggests more details on the influence of the underlying network structure on the level of efficiency. To illustrate, continue with the example network in Figure 1 . With κ = 2, Theorem 6.4 implies that the welfare at equilibrium in the network on the left hand side is at least 4/5 times the total trade surplus of the sub market between 1 and 4, and for the network on the right hand side, its equilibrium welfare is at least 4/5 times the total trade surplus of the submarket between 2 and 3. This means that merging A and B is beneficial if the submarket between 2 and 3 has a high trade value.
This theorem can be insightful for a network designer when analyzing policies having substantial change on the network structure. The designer should consider policy impacts on different layers of the network, and nurture the subnetworks that have high values and are also highly competitive.
In the remainder of this section, we further discuss the implications of this result.
Impact of Intermediary Capacity on Price of Anarchy
We start by defining a parameter, which we call the intermediary capacity of the network.
Definition 6.5. For a node pair j ∈ J; k ∈ K in network G, which are connected by at least one middleman, let w jk ≥ 1 be the number of middlemen that connect j and k. Then, w G , called the intermediary capacity of G, is defined as the minimum value among all such w jk .
Thus, every node pair j ∈ J; k ∈ K that is connected by at least one middlemen, is connected by at least w G middlemen. Further, as a corollary of Theorem 6.4, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 6.6. The price of anarchy is at least 1 − 1 2w G +1 .
Because w G ≥ 1 for any network G, Corollary 6.6 is a generalization of Theorem 6.2, note that the intermediary capacity of the network intuitively captures the degree of competition among the intermediaries. As the intermediary capacity of the network increases -i.e., as the economy becomes more competitive -the system approaches full efficiency. Note that while mergers can lower the intermediary capacity, it is not always the case, as illustrated by the example in Figure 1 .
So, Corollary 6.6 does not contradict with our earlier result that mergers can have ambiguous implication to welfare.
Extension for Subsitute Goods
Previously, we assumed that the utility of k as additive across j i.e., j U jk (Y jk ). In this section, we consider the case where the goods are a substitute. We show that a similar characterization of equilibrium based on a convex program applies but it is even simpler. Recall that y i jk is the amount of goods that intermediaries i provided by j to k; the total amount of good that i sells to k is Y i k = j y i jk ; the total amount of good that i buys from j is x i j = k y i jk ; and
is the total amount of goods that a purchaser k obtains. We assume the utility of a purchaser k is
Thus the marginal price at the purchaser k is
We further assume that there is a unit cost of c jk ≥ 0 that the intermediary needs to pay i for delivering goods from j to k. 1 Then, intermediary i's payoff function is
Given an index j * and k * , taking derivative according to y i j * k * we obtain:
Notice that if k = k * , then 
Observe that Φ(.) is a concave function, thus, we have the following first order condition for an equilibrium for all provider j * , purchaser k * and intermediary i, who are connected in the network.
Given this equilibrium condition, using a similar argument as in Theorem 4.2, we obtain the following characterization of equilibria. The proof of this result is provided in Appendix F.
Theorem 7.1. The equilibrium is unique and is the solution of the following convex program Sharing economies facilitated by multisided platforms are becoming increasingly popular in a large number of contexts (Uber, Airbnb being some of the well-known ones). Therefore, understanding the welfare implications of these platforms is important to guide policy proposals for improving social welfare. For example, as the sharing economy matures, mergers and acquisitions among platforms are likely to occur. Yet, there is little guidance from the prior literature to analyze the welfare implications of such mergers. This is because the majority of the current literature focuses on monopoly pricing problems. Our paper fills this void by developing a tractable model that provides insights about the role of network structure in affecting welfare.
Our model considers a two sided market involving both providers and purchasers, where the market clears based on a Cournot competition. We also assume the providers and purchasers have linear marginal costs and marginal revenues. In the stylized model, we demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium can be established as a series of conditions. These conditions allow us to study the implications of various interesting cases. Using that structure, we show that social welfare can improve even when two intermediaries merge. This result may appear counter intuitive given traditional antitrust analyses where decreasing competition always increases the dead weight loss. We show that the welfare implications vary depending on the resulting network structure in comparison with the structure that existed before the merger. We also provide some bounds on the price of anarchy; as defined earlier, the price of anarchy is widely used in the computer science literature and is simply the ratio between the social welfare obtained under equilibrium and the maximum social welfare that can be obtained. In that analysis, we define metrics such as the intermediary capacity of the network that can be used to influence social welfare.
Even though we presented the analysis in a stylized context, the underlying structure is relevant more broadly. For example, the analysis is also relevant to a physical retail chain context. Visualize the retailers as the platform companies. On one side of the network are manufacturers (e.g., Reebok, Under Armour). On the other side of the network are geographic locations where the retailers compete against one another. The edges between the first side and the platform now correspond to whether the retailer carries the products from the manufacturers. The edges between the platform and the second side correspond to whether the retailer has presence in the geographic location. In such a context, our insights become relevant when studying the impact of mergers of the retail chains. Again, to the best of our knowledge, supply chain literature has not studied equivalent problems, and our analysis can provide insights to such different contexts, including some nontechnological ones. Additionally, the structure is relevant even when considering extension to the structure. For example, in ad-auction context, a provider can correspond to supply aggregator firms such ValueClick, AdBrite, Burst Media, Casale Media, Kontera, Chitka, Tribal Fusion, and
Bidvertiser. So, the network may involve an additional layer. Even in this structure, notice that the analysis on mergers of intermediaries is not affected by extending one side of the graph. A similar logic may be provided to extend on the other side. In essence, we have considered a parsimonious structure for analysis which is robust to some generalizations.
In conclusion, we have provided a tractable model of competition among intermediaries. Given that our main focus was to show how the traditional antitrust analysis will not work in a platform context, we made many simplifying assumptions. A future extension of this work could be one which extends the model to include other important features such as more general form of utilities, uncertainty, asymmetric information, and network formation questions. Also, it would be of interest to study more deeply in the future the welfare implications when characterizing a multi-partite graph involving aggregators on the publisher-and/or the provider-side; or when purchasers can easily substitute among the offerings. Proof. We first illustrate the main idea of the proof with an example of the network in Figure 7 . The example will also subsequently be used to demonstrate some seemingly counterintuitive results when we later study the sensitivity of the results. As for the example, assume a networked structured as in Figure 7 , with two intermediaries (#1 and #2), two purchasers (a and b), and a provider (s).
Readers not interested in the characterization of the proof may skip to the end of the section.
We will use the optimality conditions of individual players' payoffs to characterize the equilibrium. We already know that, at equilibrium, the inventory constraints imply x Therefore, we can write the payoff of Intermediary #2 as functions of y:
Notice that Y sa = y Thus, the derivative of Π 2 (y) according to y #2 sa is ∂Π 2 (y)
Because Π 2 (y) is concave, we obtain the following necessary condition for Π 2 (y) to be optimal:
if y 
Similarly, for intermediary #1, with
sb , his payoff is:
Taking derivative of Π 1 according to y #1 sa and y
#1
sb we have
The first order conditions for Π 1 (y) to be optimal are if y 
Now, consider the optimal solution of the following quadratic program:
Let z
sb be the dual variables of the constraints (16), (17), and (18), respectively. The Lagrangian relaxation of this convex program is
The first order conditions of the Lagrangian relaxation according to X s give X s = z Replacing z with y, we obtain a set of conditions that are exactly the equations of the game captured in Figure 7 . We need to show that the first order conditions of the payoff for intermediaries, (12), (13), and (14) 
Notice that because z #2 sa = y #2 sa , this condition is exactly the first order condition of for the payoff of intermediary #1 in (12). Similarly, we can also have the equivalence between the equilibrium condition of intermediary #2, (13) and (14), and the constraints (17) and (18 The payoff for intermediary i is
The derivative of Π i (y) with respect to y i jk is
The above equation holds because x i j = l∈K y i jl . Hence, the first order condition for y to be a Nash equilibrium is the following: 
We will show that (20) has a special property that allows us to characterize its unique solution by a quadratic convex program. First, consider the unique solution of (6). By the complementarity slackness condition, x, y, X, Y is the solution if for every i, j, k such that ij and ik are connected in G, there exists a dual variable z i jk satisfying
Furthermore,
Observe that (24) implies that z i jk = y i jk . Therefore, from (21) , (22) will be the only active players. Thus the welfare of the system is independent of k.
It remains to consider the case µ a < µ b < 2µ a . According to the equilibrium characterization, the amount of goods delivered to a and b are
The total number of goods delivered is
k+2 , the welfare is
When k increases from 1 to ∞, t = 2µa−µ b k+2 decreases from t 1 := 2µa−µ b 3 to t ∞ := 0.
Notice that f (t) is a quadratic function and
decreases if k increases; if t 1 > µ b − µ a , then as k increases f (t) will first increase, then decrease.
a , which implies our result.
We consider two numerical examples where both α, β are positive.
Example 1: α = 1; β = 1; µ a = 3; µ b = 9 See Figure 8 Without intermediaries #2, 3, . . . , J + 1, intermediary #1 will sell exclusively to purchaser b. y Here, as J increases, the welfare initially increases then decreases below the monopolistic scenario. Proof. According to the equilibrium computation (7) and (8), as J increases, the total amount of goods s provides and the amount of goods a receives both increase. This shows that s and b's payoff increases. The amount of goods delivered to b, on the other hand decreases. As argued above, this is a natural consequence of increasing competition for trade between s and a.
The formula for the payoff of intermediary 1 is µ a y
Replacing the solution of (7), we obtain that the payoff of intermediary 1 is
Thus, the payoff of intermediary 1 decreases as J increases. The payoff of each intermediary 2, 3, .., J + 1 is µ a y
J+2 ) 2 , which also decreases as J increases.
D Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. Let y i jk be the Nash equilibrium. The social welfare with y i jk as the decision is
to apply to (28) to obtain the following inequality:
To prove the theorem, we will show that the Left hand side of (29) is at least SW Opt and the Right hand side of (29) is 3 2 SW N ash . Focusing on the Left hand side of (29), first observe that
Thus, Left hand side of (29) ≥ from (27)
Focusing on the right hand side of (29), we will show that the right hand side of (29) is equal to SW N ash . To see this, observe that from the Nash equilibrium condition (20), we have
This is equivalent to E Proof of Theorem 6.4
Let Y * jk be the amount of goods k shown on provider j that gives the optimal social welfare OP T (E κ ) of the κ-subnetwork. That is Y * maximizes j,k
where Y are non-negative and Y jk = 0 if j and k are connected by fewer than κ intermediaries.
Denote X * j = k Y * jk . We introduce the following notations. 
Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.2, the right hand side of (33) is 2κ+1 2κ SW N ash . In order to bound the left hand side of (33), we show the following.
Assuming that (34) and (35) are true then the right hand side of (33) is at least Hence, we conclude that OP T (E κ ) ≤ 
On the other hand,
Notice that c i jk = c jk if i is connected to both j and k and 0 otherwise. Thus, to bound i (c i j ) 2 , we can bound the number of terms c 2 jk and c jk c jl that appear in (37). There are κ jk intermediaries that connect to both j and k, thus c 2 jk appears exactly κ jk in (37). For k < l; the number of terms c jk c jl that appear in (37) is twice the number of intermediaries who is connected to all three nodes j, k and l. Hence the number of terms c jk c jl appearing in (37) is at most 2 min{κ jk , κ jl }. So, These equations capture exactly the relationship between the quantities of amount of goods traded.
Second, the complementarity condition for an optimal solution of the convex program implies that if (39) holds with strict inequality, then To see the reverse direction, let X, Y , and y be the quantities traded at equilibrium. Define z i jk := 2y i jk . We need to show that X, Y is the optimal solution of the convex program and z is the dual. First, the relationships among X, Y , and y implies the exactly the first order condition of the convex program among X, Y , and z . Second, the following equilibrium condition 
